Verbal labels, such as the words ''dog'' and ''guitar,'' activate conceptual knowledge more effectively than corresponding environmental sounds, such as a dog bark or a guitar strum, even though both are unambiguous cues to the categories of dogs and guitars (Lupyan & Thompson-Schill, 2012). We hypothesize that this advantage of labels emerges because word-forms, unlike other cues, do not vary in a motivated way with their referent. The sound of a guitar cannot help but inform a listener to the type of guitar making it (electric, acoustic, etc.). The word ''guitar'' on the other hand, can leave the type of guitar unspecified. We argue that as a result, labels gain the ability to cue a more abstract mental representation, promoting efficient processing of category members. In contrast, environmental sounds activate representations that are more tightly linked to the specific cause of the sound. Our results show that upon hearing environmental sounds such as a dog bark or guitar strum, people cannot help but activate a particular instance of a category, in a particular state, at a particular time, as measured by patterns of response times on cue-picture matching tasks (Exps. 1-2) and eye-movements in a task where the cues are task-irrelevant (Exp. 3). In comparison, labels activate concepts in a more abstract, decontextualized way-a difference that we argue can be explained by labels acting as ''unmotivated cues''.
Introduction
Consider how we recognize rain. We can feel its coldness on our skin. We can tell it is raining by the glistening pavement. We can also recognize rain by the sound of drops falling onto a roof or bouncing off a sidewalk and in the words of Ruth Millikan (1998), ''falling on English speakers, here is another way [rain] can sound: 'Hey, guys, it's raining!''' (p. 64).
The concept of rain can be activated by inputs from multiple perceptual modalities. Concepts can also be activated via language. We present four experiments aimed at contrasting these two ways of activating familiar concepts: through nonverbal environmental sounds, and through auditory verbal labels. Do these cues activate the same knowledge-two pathways to the same concept of rain? And if not, why not?
The question of whether verbal and nonverbal cues activate concepts differently was studied by Lupyan and Thompson-Schill (2012) who found that compared to words such as ''dog,'' equally familiar and unambiguous environmental sounds such as a <dog bark> 1 resulted in consistently slower recognition of subsequently presented pictures of dogs. This ''label-advantage'' persisted for delays as long as 1.5 s after cue offset for familiar categories and was also observed for new categories of ''alien musical instruments'' for which participants learned either names or corresponding sounds-evidence that the advantage did not arise from the sound cues being less familiar or more difficult to process. We thus have a situation where, equating for overall associative strength, labels nevertheless activate concepts more effectively than nonverbal cues. This special status of labels is taken by some to be a given because while nonverbal cues like dog-barks can be thought of as simply associative, ''words refer; they do not merely associate' ' (Waxman & Gelman, 2009, p. 259 ). An alternative is that reference is born from associations, and what is special about the word-referent relationship is the unique pattern of associations it implements. We argue that a critical distinction between verbal labels and other cues to category membership is that dog barks, the sound of rain-indeed any nonverbal cue-is that such cues vary in a lawful way with properties of the events that caused them. 
